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Summary  findings
Recent theory increasingly emphasizes the association of  period studied.
short-term debt with higher-quality firms and better  L  Large firms are more likely to have access to long
incentives.  The possibility of premature liquidation, for  term debt than small firms. The former are on
example, may serve as a disciplinary device to improve  average more profitable.
firm performance.  At the same time the role of long-  * Conditional on size, operating profits do not
term debt, especially when it is heavily subsidized, is  increase the probability of receiving long-term credit
being rethought because so many development banks are  and may actually decrease it. This suggests that the
plagued with nonperforming  loans and doubts about the  mechanism used to allocate long-term resources in
selection criteria used in allocating funds.  Ecuador mav be flawed.
Jaramillo and Schiantarelli explore empirical evidence  *  The allocation problem was worse for directed
about the structure of debt maturity in Ecuadorean firms.  credit. There is some evidenct that, after financial
They discuss how it has been affected by government  liberalization, the problem was less severe.
intervention  in credit markets, and by financial  * There is a strong positive association between asset
liberalization.  Using firnm-level  panel data, they  maturity and debt maturity, a matching of assets and
investigate the determinants of access to long-term debt  liabilities.
in Ecuador.  Finally, they provide evidence about how  * Shorter-term loans are not conducive to greater
the maturity structure of debt affects firms' performance,  productivity while long-term loans may lead to
particularly productivity and capital accumtulation. They  inmprovements  in productivity.
find that:  * While long-term loans may positively affect the
Long-term debt is very unevenly distributed.  Almost  quality of capital accumulation, they do not have an
30 percent  of firms never have access to it during the  impact on the amount of fixed investment.
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The main emphasis in the theoretical and empirical analysis of  firm financing
has been on the choice of debt versus (internal or external) equity.  '  Although, the idea of
debt as an homogeneous source of funds is a powerful theoretical construct and a useful
first step, one must go beyond the leverage decision and investigate other dimensions of
the debt choice. In particular the nature of debt and its incentive properties can differ
according, for instance, to its maturity (long and short) and to the providers (banks or
markets). 2
In this paper we plan to address  the issue of the maturity structure of firms' debt
and to provide some empirical evidence for Ecuador. 3 Although the issue of  the maturity
structure of debt is important for both developed and developing countries, there are some
aspects of the problem that have been more often (although not exclusively) raised with
respect to the latter.  In particular, there has been a  widespread perception both by
domestic and international policy makers that asymmetric information and contract
enforcement problems may lead to a shortage of long term finance.  This shortage is
thought to have a cost in terms of productivity growth and capital accumulation and it
may justify some form of government intervention. The setting up in most developing
countries of long termn  credit institutions (development banks) and/or of programs to
foster the provision of long term credit  was indeed the policy response to this problem.
I See Harris and Raviv (1990) for a comprehensive critical review.
2 On the maturity choice see Myers (1977), Diamond (1991), Diamond (1993), Kale and Noe (1990), Hart
and Moore (1994), and Barclay and Smith (1995). On the role of intermediated debt see Diamond (1984),
Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Rajan (1992).
3See  also Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1996) for a parallel analysis for the UK and Italy and Schiantarelli
and Srivastava (1996) for India.2
The emphasis on long-term finance and on the potentially adverse consequences when it
is in short supply is somewhat at odds with recent theoretical contributions that
emphasize the fact that the use of short term debt may be associated with higher quality
firms and may have better incentive properties. In particular,  the possibility of premature
liquidation may act as a discipline device that improves firms' performance. A re-
thinking of  the role of long term debt, particularly  when heavily subsidized, has also
been prompted by the problems encountered in many countries by development banks in
terms of non performing loans and by doubts about the selection criteria used in
allocating funds.
The purpose of our paper is three fold.  First, we plan to document the maturity
structure of debt for Ecuadorian firms in the 80's and early 90's. We will also discuss
how the maturity structure has been affected by government interventions in credit
markets and by the process of financial liberalization that started in the mid 80's.
Second, using firm level panel data, we intend to analyze how the access to long term
debt  is related to various firms' characteristics. Third, we provide some empirical
evidence on the impact of the access to long terrn debt on firms' productivity and on
capital accumulation.  The empirical work contained in this paper is based both on
aggregate financial data and on micro level data (especially the latter). The micro data
consists of accounting data for several hundred of firms  collected by the
Superintendencia de Companias.
Although the empirical analysis we provide constitute a useful preliminary step, it
must be clear that the paper does not allow one to answer the ultimate question whether3
one ought to subsidize (directly or indirectly)  the provision of long term finance and, in
the case the answer is yes,  which is the best way to do so. The issue is very complex
because the consequences of the distortions generated by programs of subsidized or
directed credit must be compared  to the imperfections in the capital market due to
information problems that would exist even in the absence of administrative controls. 4
Moreover, government intervention in promoting the supply of long terrn resources often
has multiple objectives like redressing regional discrepancies or promoting greater
equality in income distribution that we do not address at all in this paper. Finally, even if
one were to satisfied with the narrower focus we have chosen, the data available to us fall
short of  giving definitive answers conceming the effects of government supported long
term credit.  In particular one would optimally need detailed information at the firm level
on the amount of long (and short term) credit that is subsidized,  together with
information of terms and conditions of each loan and  on repayment rates by type of
program.  All this said, the empirical analysis of determinants and consequences of the
maturity structure of debt we provide in this paper is a useful first step that highlights
some interesting problems and issues in the allocation of  long term debt that are relevant
for many LDC's.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II we give a  macroeconomic
overview of the financial developments in Ecuador and on the maturity structure of debt,
4See  Jaramillo Schiantarelli and Weiss (1993) and (1996) on the relationship between credit allocation and
firm characteristics and on the effects of financial constraints on investment pre and post financial
liberalization. See also Calomiris and Himmelberg (1995) on subsidized credit in Japan.4
using aggregate data.  In section III  we use two different panel data sets, to provide some
evidence on the issue of firms'  access to credit and how it relates to firms' characteristics.
In Section IV we estimate both a production function and an investment equation to
assess the impact of the maturity structure of debt on firns'  productivity and capital
accumulation. Section V concludes the paper.
II.- MATURITY STRUCTURE  AND THE ROLE OF SUBSIDIZED CREDIT
Until  the  first  half  of  the  eighties,  the  Ecuadorian  financial  system  was
characterized by  widespread regulations,  including  interest rate controls, directed credit
programs  and other government  interference  in the  allocation of finance. As  a result,
Ecuador exhibited very poor measures of fmancial depth. For instance,  the M2 to GDP
ratio was low and even declined from 20%  in  1976 to  17% in  1983. One of the most
important  determinants of  the weakness  in  mobilizing  resources through the  financial
system, was the interest rate policy followed in the 70's and in the early 80's. During this
period, interest rates were fixed by the Government at levels at or below the inflation rate.
Zero or negative real interest rates discouraged financial savings and limited the ability of
banks  to mobilize private funds.
However,  directed  credit  programs  from  public  institutions,  in  particular  the
Central  Bank, compensated the inability  of the financial  system to  generate funds for
investment. In  1984, these credit programs  represented  approximately 50% of the total
credit  in the economy. This explains why, despite the situation of financial repression,5
total credit in the economy increased during the 70's and early 80's, and peaked in 1983,
when total credit reached 23% of GDP (see Figure  1 and the first two columns of Table 1,
reporting credit as a percentage of GDP and real credit growth rates).
Beginning in 1984, Ecuador introduced a set of reforms that gradually liberalized
the financial market. These reforms eliminated  or scaled down directed credit programs
and removed administrative controls on interest rates. These reforms lead to an increase
in real interest rates and improved the ability of the financial system to mobilize resources
(see Figure 2). As a result the M2 to GDP ratio increased from 17% in 1983 to 23% in
1987, mainly  due to the introduction  of the  "polizas  de  acumulation".  However, the
supply of credit was drastically reduced  due to the contraction of government provided
loanable funds.  As Figure 1 shows, total credit in the economy decreased steadily during
the  second  half of  the eighties  and  was  as  low  as  9%  of GDP  in  1990. The  main
explanation for this behavior was the reduction  of directed credit programs from public
sector institutions that decreased their share in total credit from 52.7% in 1984 to 9% in
1992, as we can see in Table 2. In 1988 also the process of  financial deepening suffered a
setback, reflected in a fall of the M2 to GDP ratio, followed however by  a continuation
of the earlier improvements in the 90's.
If one looks at the term structure of debt (see Table 1, the last five columns), long
term debt is quantitatively much less important than short term debt.  In the early  80's, in
the aggregate long term credit (with maturity  greater than a year) accounted for 12% of
total debt. During the second half of the eighties, its share of total debt increased to 17%6
in 1989, but dropped to 8% in 1992.  Real growth rate of long term credit was negative
for most years, although short term debt declined  even faster.
It  is  difficult  to  asses  exactly  the  role  of  directed  credit  programs  on  the
availability of long term credit. However, most  programs of  the Corporaci6n Financiera
Nacional (CFN) and Banco Nacional de Fomento (BNF), supported sectors and activities
like exports  (FOPEX), small industry (FOPINAR)  and agriculture, with long term lines
of  credit  for the purchase of  machinery  and  fixed  assets. The programs financed  by
rediscount  lines that commercial banks  could  use with  the Central Bank, were instead
typically short term, although it was a common  practice to renew credit lines extended to
firms. The programs financed directly by  the Central Bank were very important in the
first  half  of  the  80's  (89%  of  total  directed  credit)  and  decreased  in  importance
throughout the 80's and early 90's  (they were  32% of total directed credit in 1992) (see
Table 4). In the last two lines of Table 3 we report the proportion of directed long term
credit  relative to total long term credit  and the proportion of directed short term credit
relative to total short term credit.  The data confirm that the percentage of directed credit
is much higher for longer maturities. This  percentage  decreases from 59.3% in 1985 to
35.9% in 1990. It then increases to 63.4% and 78.7% in the following two years, in spite
of the real decline in directed long term  credit,  since market provided long term credit
declines  even faster.  The percentage of directed short term credit decreases from 31.1%
in 1985 to 3.3% in 1992. Remember than in the last two years real total short term credit
expanded, following the real credit crunch at the end of the 80's.7
We have  already  mentioned that  at  the  beginning  of  the  80's  real  (ex post)
"market"  lending rates were negative,  even in  the absence  of subsidies. They became
positive, on average, until 1987, and negative again in the following two years, following
the earthquake and a period of fiscal laxity, resulting in a fall in the M2 to GDP ratio.  In
the 1990's real rates have been mostly positive and increasing (see Figure 2).  Interest on
directed credit programs like FOPEX and others administered by CFN were significantly
lower than lending market rates, as Table  4  shows.  Market rates were  1.58  times the
subsidized  ones in  1983, 1.94 times in  1988 and only  1.19 times in  1991. The spread
between-the two was 21.57 percentage points in 1988 and 8.82 percentage points in 1991.
III.- FIRM  LEVEL  EVIDENCE  ON ACCESS  TO LONG  TERM DEBT AND ON
DEBT MATURITY
In this section we will discuss the micro level evidence on the maturity structure
of  firms'  financing.  We use two samples  in  our analysis.5 Both of them are based on
accounting  data collected by the Superintendencia de Companias. The first (unbalanced)
sample (SCI from now on) includes 731 Ecuadorian manufacturing companies during the
period  1984-1988 and contains more detailed  information  on firms'  real and financial
variables. Moreover, for the companies in this sample we have been able identify whether
they belong or not to an industrial group with bank association. For this sample we have
available separate figures for short term (non trade) debt, long term debt, and trade debt,
5See  the Data Appendix for a description of the data.8
so that our measure of length of maturity equals long term debt divided by the sum of
long term debt, short term debt and trade debt.
The second sample, that unfortunately cannot be linked to the first one, is also
derived from the data of the Superintendencia  de Companias, includes  850 companies
and covers the period 1984-1992 (SC2 from now on). The period covered by this sample
is longer and more recent so that it allows us to investigate more convincingly changes in
the allocation mechanism of long term  credit,  before and  after financial liberalization.
This data set, however, contains fewer and much more aggregate variables.  In this case
we only  have available  data on  total  long  term  liabilities  (that includes  also debt of
shareholders  -quite  important  in  smaller  companies-  and  other  deferred  liabilities
unrelated to fmancial or trade debt).  In  this case our measure of length of maturity is
total long term liabilities divided by total liabilities.
111.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE TWO PANELS
For the firms in the SC1 sample, long  term financial debt represented in  1984
11.5% of total debt (see Table 5).  This figure is of the same order of magnitude as the
one obtained from aggregate financial data. The  share of long  term debt in total debt
increased until 1987, reflecting the faster decline in short term debt during that period. In
the SC2 sample, we observe after 1987 a decrease in the length of maturity, as a result of
the real decline in long term debt and of the real expansion in short term debt we have
already observed at the aggregate level.9
One striking facts concerning the maturity structure of financing is that there is a
large number of firms that appear to be cut-off altogether from any access to long term
debt. In the SC  1 sample, which is the one  to be used to draw inferences about access
given the more detailed figures on debt,  214 firms (29.3% of the total) never received
long term financial credit, 311 firms (42.5% of the total) had long term debt during some
years, while only 211 firms (28.2% of the total) always had long term debt (see Table 6,
Part  I).  In the SC2 sample, which, because  of the more aggregate nature of the debt
variables is bound to present a rosier picture, 25 firms (2.9% of the total) never had long
term liabilities, 538 firms (63.3%) had long term liabilities during some years, and 287
(33.8% of the total) had it during the whole period.
It is interesting to note that  according  to  the SC1 sample, access to  long term
financing improves over time (see Table 6, Part II). In 1984, only 37% of firms had long
term debt. This number increases to  59.2% in  1987 and decreases slightly to 58.9% in
1988. Unfortunately, we cannot track  the question  of access in the more recent years
because the SC2 sample is less informative in this sense;
If we split the SC1 sample by  size, we can see that access to  long term credit
varies positively with size (see Table 7, Part I). Among the largest group of companies,
58% had long term debt in every year of the period. Conversely, only 11% of the micro
firms and  17% of the small firms had similar access to long term financing. Half of the
micro firms and 44% of the small firms never had long term debt, while only  1.9% of
large  firms never had  long term  debt.  Similar  conclusions concerning the correlation
between access to long term debt and size are derived from sample SC2.10
Access to long term credit also has a positive (simple) correlation with age: older
firms have better access to this type of financing  than younger firms, as we can see in
Table 7, Part II.  For instance 35.7% of the youngest firms have never received long term
debt, while the figure is 22.7% for the oldest firms.
We have also explored the relationship  between  access to long term credit and
bank association6. Almost half of the firms that have an association with banks, had long
term  loans during the whole period.  In contrast,  only  25% of the firms with no  bank
association  had  regular access  to  long  term  financing  (see  Table  7,  Part  III).  It  is
importatit to mention that older firms and  companies  with bank association are usually
the larger ones.
Finally, in Tables 8 we investigate the association between the maturity structure
of  liabilities  and  other  firms'  characteristics,  for  the  SC  1  and  the  SC2  sample
respectively. In the first three columns of the table we continue to partition firms between
those  who never, sometimes, always  had  access to  long term debt.  In the last three
columns we partition the firm-year observations  according to whether maturity is below
the  median,  between the median  and  the  third  quartile,  and above the third quartile.
Obviously, the share of long term credit to total credit is higher in companies that always
had long term financing compared to the rest. Firms that always had long term debt, are
larger, judging by their mean or median real capital stock or real sales, more leveraged,
with  a  higher proportion of  fixed  assets  to  total  assets,  more profitable and  more
dynamic, judging by the real sales growth rate. However, the investment rate (the ratio of
6 Bank association  was defined  whenever  management  or important  shareholders  of manufacturing  firms
were  also  members  of  the Board  of Directors  of a financial  institution.11
investment to the capital stock) is lower for this group of firms. The ratio of liquid assets
to total capital is no different for firms that never had access to long term credit and those
that always had it, although it is higher for companies  that have had long term financing
during some years.  The results obtained when firms are partitioned according to quartiles
are similar with two interesting exceptions. Firstly, the (operating) profit rate is the lowest
for  the  group  with  a  maturity length  in  the  top  quartile  relative  to the  other  firms.
Secondly, the liquid asset to total asset ratio seems to be monotonically decreasing with
maturity.  The  results  for the  SCI  and  the  SC2  sample  are very  similar. The  only
difference is that profit is always positively  correlated both to the access and length of
maturity.
111.2.  ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE ON ACCESS  AND MATURITY
We now discuss some of the econometric  evidence on the access to long term
debt. In Table 9 we report in the first two columns the results obtained using probit and
logit models for the probability of obtaining long term credit for the SC  1 sample. In order
to take into account of the panel data nature of the data, in the last two columns we also
report the results for the probit random effects model (see Butler and Moffit (1982)) and
for  the  fixed  effect  logit  model  (see  Chamberlain  (1980)).  In  order  to  minimize
endogeneity problems, at least in the logit models with fixed effects, we have included all
regressors as beginning of period (if stocks) or last period values (if flows). All equations
in this  subsection include also sector and  year dummies  (not reported here for brevity12
sake), with the exception of the logit model with  fixed effects which includes only year
dummies.  Although  the  significance  of  the  coefficient  varies across  estimators, the
direction  of  the  effects of  the  various  variables  is  in  most  cases  consistent  across
estimators.  One of the clearest results is that  size (proxied here by the logarithm of the
real  capital  stock  at  the  beginning  of  the  period,  LRKAP1)  is  very  important  in
determining  access to long term credit.  More  specifically,  the probability in obtaining
long  term  credit  is greater for  larger  firms.  This  result  is consistent with one  of the
prediction  in the model by Diamond (1991)  that shows  that for firms with low credit
rating (presumably the small ones in our case), an increase in quality is associated with
gaining access to long term debt.7 In his model the basic trade off is between the benefit
of short term debt, because it allows firms  to take advantage of favorable news certain,
and  the  liquidation  risk they  have  to  bear,  since  opportunistic  lenders  may try  to
appropriate the surplus by forcing the firm into bankruptcy.  However, great caution is
needed  before linking the empirical results  for Ecuador  to the theoretical models that
have been proposed in the literature.  One problem is that lenders are assumed to be profit
maximizing  in  the  model,  which  may  or  may  not  be  an  accurate  assumption  for
Ecuadorian intermediaries in their role of providers of directed credit.
Since we have used the real value of fixed assets as a proxy for size, the positive
effect  of size also reflects the fact that the availability  of collateral is a prerequisite to
obtain  long term debt. Finally, the positive effect of the size variable could capture the
7See  Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1996) for a more detailed discussion of the theoretical models of
maturity choice.13
greater  economic and political bargaining  power  by large firms in obtaining long term
directed credit.
Apart (nearly) from size, no other firm characteristic has a statistically significant
coefficient at conventional levels in the fixed effect logit equation, although the direction
of the  effects are identical to  those  in  the other  models.  The lack of precision in the
coefficient  estimates in the fixed effect  logit model,  should not be too surprising since
estimation of the conditional likelihood function  implies a loss of efficiency since many
observations  drop  out  from  the  (conditional)  likelihood  (see  Chamberlain (1980) for
details).
Given size, past operating profits as a proportion of total assets (fixed capital plus
inventories plus liquid assets), CFK 1, does not have a statistically significant effect on the
access to long term debt in any equation (actually the point estimate is always negative).
One has to remember that the larger firms  in the panel are more profitable than smaller
ones. However,  it is somewhat worrisome  from the point  of view of the allocation of
directed credit that, conditional on size, profits  do not -matter, in determining access to
long term credit.
The association with  a business  group  with bank links, captured by the
dummy  variable  BAND,  is  not  a  significant  determinant  of  access  either.  This  is
somewhat surprising, since members of business groups may be thought to have superior
clout  in  accessing  financial  resources,  in  addition  to  being  informationally  less
disadvantaged.  Similarly, everything else equal, the age of the firm (summarized by the
AGE2  through  to  AGE4  dummies  in  deviation  from  the  youngest  firms)  is  not  a14
significant determinant of access. The explanation for both these results  may be that the
effect  of bank association or age is basically  subsumed by the size variable, given the
high probability that larger firms are group members and, at the same time, older.
The overall past degree of leverage, LEVI,  is positively related to access to long
term debt. Past access to both short term and long term debt may work here as a predictor
of  the ability to obtain long term debt (more on the role of leverage below). The initial
stock of liquid assets, LASKI, does not play, instead,  a statistically significant role.
In Table  10 we report the results  for the SC  1 sample from estimating a sample
selectiorf model for the length of debt maturity, using standard two steps procedures. The
dependent variable is long term debt as a proportion  of total debt, including trade debt,
MAT. We report the results obtained when either a probit model or a logit model is used
in the first step.  The coefficient of cash flow  in the maturity equation is negative, which
emphasizes the worries we have already express concerning criteria for the allocation of
long term directed credit in Ecuador.  Paralleling the results for the access, the length of
maturity  is positively and significantly  related to lagged leverage. As we have already
explained, this latter result may reflect the fact that having obtained debt in the past is an
indication of the ability to obtain long term debt in the future. It is also consistent with the
idea that higher leverage increases the risk of liquidation and makes long term debt more
attractive for firms.  The length of maturity is also positively associated with size, but the
association is not very significant.
There also evidence of a very strong and positive association between lagged asset
maturity  (proxied here by the ratio between  fixed capital and the sum of fixed capital15
(estimated) inventories and liquid assets, ASS 1. This is consistent with the idea that firms
tend  to  match  the  maturity  structure  of  assets  and  liabilities,  as  implied  by  the
conventional  wisdom and as predicted  by  the  more formal  model by Hart  and  More
(1994). It is also consistent with the hypothesis  that fixed assets may be a better form of
collateral for long term debt, so that their availability is associated with longer maturity of
debt.  Finally the growth of real sales, GYREAL 1, has a positive but not significant effect
on maturity.
One important issue that  deserves  to  be  investigated  is whether changes have
occurred over time in the determinants of access to long term credit  and, conditional on
having  access, on the maturity structure of debt. In particular, we would like to  know
whether financial liberalization has introduced any change in the allocation mechanism of
long term debt.  We have used the longer SC2 sample to obtain some evidence on this
8 issue.  In Table 11 we have reported the results obtained estimating  the sample selection
model for the SCI sample. After some experimentation, we have allowed  the coefficients
on  lagged operating profits as a proportion of total assets (PROFI)  and on the lagged
value of the logarithm of real assets (LRTA1) to vary before and after liberalization,  both
in the access and maturity equation (in Table  12 LD is a dummy variable that equals one
from  1989 onward). 9 The results suggest that the probability of having access to long
term  debt before financial liberalization  is  positively  related to  size and leverage and
negatively  related to  profits. These  results  are  similar  to  those obtained  for the  SCI
8  In order to investigate the effect of financial liberalization, it would have been desirable to be able to link
the two samples in order to cover a longer data period. both pre and post liberalization. As we have already
explained this is not possible.
9  Although financial liberalization started in 1984. it has been a process and it has included set backs. We
have also experimented with different breaking points. obtaining similar results.16
sample. The main difference is that the profit variable is now negative and signif.,int  i-
was  not  significant for the  SC1 sample),  making  even stronger  the concerns on  the
criteria  used to  allocate  long term  directed  credit.  The coefficient on profits  incrases
significantly after liberalization, but it remains  negative. The increase in the value of the
coefficient may reflect the fact that financial intermediaries start paying more attention at
accounting measures of firms' credit rating after financial liberalization.  This would also
be confirmed by the fact that the (positive)  coefficient  of the log of total real assets is
significantly  and substantially larger after  financial reform, which is consistent with a
greater importance of collateral.  The negativity  of the coefficient also in the post reform
period could be explained by the fact that better (more profitable) firms prefer to use short
term  credit, in order to take advantage  of future revelation  of positive information, as
suggested  by Diamond (1991) for the  firms  at the upper  end of the quality spectrum.
However, there is also another possible  explanation  for this result.  As we have already
pointed out, although the real supply of long term directed credit continues to decrease in
1991 and 1992, market provided long term credit shrinks even faster. As a result the share
of directed credit out of total long term credit provided to firm increases, and it is possible
that the allocation of this portion of long term credit is still problematic also in the more
recent years.
The  sign and magnitude of the profit  coefficients in the second stage maturity
equation  parallels the ones in the probit  equation  and, therefore, we will not repeat the
arguments  we have just  gone  through.  Size  does  not  play a  significant role  in the17
maturity  equation, while the maturity composition  of assets and the degree of leverage
both have a significantly positive effect on the length of the maturity structure of debt.
IV. MATURITY AND PERFORMANCE
In this section we discuss the effect  of the maturity structure of debt on firms'
performance. More specifically we address two main issues. The first one is whether the
availability  of long term finance allows firms  to improve their productivity. The second
one is whether it stimulates capital accumulation by firms. There are at least two reasons
why access to long term debt may improve firms'  productivity. On the one hand it may
allow  firms access to better and more productive  technologies, which the firm may be
reluctant  in financing with short term debt because  of fears of liquidation. On the other,
lack of  availability of long term finance may put a squeeze on working capital and this
may have adverse consequences on productivity.  The other side of the coin is that short
term  debt, if it carries with it more continuous  monitoring, may force firms to  reduce
inefficiencies  and to  increase productivity,  at each  level  of measurable inputs (capital
stock, number of workers, materials).  Ultimately the issue is an empirical one.
In  Table  12 we estimate  a  standard  Cobb  Douglas production  function, with
capital,  labor and materials, for the SCI  sample,  the only  one for which the necessary
data are available.  The logarithm of the real value of sales, LRY, is used as a proxy for
output.  LRN denotes the log of employment,  LRK the log of the real value of fixed
assets, and LRM the real value of material used in production.  In addition we allow total18
factor productivity to depend upon the maturity structure of debt and also on the overall
degree of  leverage. One potential  reason  for the inclusion  of leverage is that financial
pressure  may force  the firm and  its  managers  to  be  more efficient.'0 However, it is
possible that with more leveraging, controlling shareholders may have a smaller incentive
to strive for efficiency, since they reap a  smaller  fraction of the rewards.  We estimate
different specifications of the equations in terms of its dynamic structure. All equations
are estimated by GMM after taking first differences (see Arellano and Bond (1992).1"  The
first difference transformation removes the firm specific and time invariant components
of the error term. Removal of the firm specific component  of the error term is important
in order to  avoid the coefficient of maturity  simply capturing  the fact that better firms
may simply receive more long term debt.  Lagged values (two or more periods) of the
regressors and of the dependent variable are used as instruments to account for potential
endogeneity  of  the  regressors, either  because  the  variables  are  decided jointly  with
production  or because there are measurement  errors.  All  equations contain also year
dummnies. In the table we also report the test of over-identifying restrictions (denoted
here as the Sargan test), distributed as chi-squared,  and tests for first and second order
serial correlation (ml  and m2 respectively), distributed as a standardized normal.
The  results  suggest  that  when  beginning  of  period  maturity  together  with
beginning of period  leverage is added to  the static  version of the production function,
there is no statistically significant effect on productivity.  When maturity and leverage are
entered  as  end  of  period  variables,  the  effect  of  maturity  is  positive  and  almost
'° See also Nickell and Nicolitsas  (1995) for an analysis using UK panel data.
" The DPD program  by Arellano  and Bond (1988) is used for estimation.19
significant,  while the leverage effect  is  virtually  zero.  When the  leverage variable is
excluded from the equation, the effect of maturity  becomes significant. Still the test of
overidentifying restrictions of all the specifications  we have illustrated so far suggests
that  there  is  some  form  of  mispecification.  We  have  explored  one  such  form  of
mispecification,  namely  dynamic  mispecification.  We have therefore  re-estimated the
production  function  including  the  lagged  value  of  the  dependent  variable  and
contemporaneous and lagged values of all the regressors (financial and real). This model
can  be  interpreted  as the  unrestricted  version  of  a  model  in  which  the dynamics  is
generated by an autoregressive error term  of order one.  The results are reported in the
last column of the table. Now the equation  passes the test of overidentifying restrictions.
Again  we  get  the  result  that  contemporaneous  maturity  has  a  positive  effect  on
productivity, while the leverage effects are insignificant.
What  is  the  impact  of  the  maturity  structure  of  debt  and  fixed  capital
accumulation? We investigate this issue by estimating  an augmented accelerator type of
investment function, where the investment rate, IK, is a function of its own lagged value,
of the contemporaneous and once lagged  rate of growth in real sales, GYR.  past cash
flow (net of interest rate payments), CFKN,  leverage, LEV, and maturity, MAT. All the
coefficients have been allowed to differ across small and large firms (S denotes small and
L large in the variables'  definition).'2 The results,  obtained using the GMM estimator,
are reported in Table  13. As one would expect if capital market imperfections are more
important  for smaller firms  than for  larger  firms,  the coefficient  is greater and  more
12 Firms are classified as large if their fixed capital stock exceeds 6000.000 dollars at 1975 prices.20
significant  for the former. The other financial  variables,  leverage and  maturity, do not
appear to play an important role, and are not  significant at conventional levels, whether
they  are  included  contemporaneously  or  once  lagged.  When their  contemporaneous
values  are  used as  regressors, there  is  some  weak  evidence of a  positive  association
between  maturity and investment, but  only  for  large firms  (t =  1.58), while for small
firns  the association is actually negative (with a t =  -1.73).
V. CONCLUSIONS
What have we learned from the  empirical  analysis of the maturity structure of
debt  in  Ecuador?  The most  striking  fact  we  have  discovered  is  the  very  unequal
distribution  of the maturity structure of debt. This is summarized by the fact that, at one
end of the spectrum, almost 30% of all fi-ms never have access to long term credit during
the period covered by our richer panel. At the other end of the spectrum, almost 30% of
all firms always have some long term debt among their liabilities.  The main determinant
of the probability of obtaining long term credit is a firm's  size (proxied by the real value
of the fixed assets). This positive association is consistent with several explanations. One
is simply that the availability of collateral  is a prerequisite to obtain long term credit.
Moreover, since larger firms in Ecuador tend to be more profitable, this result could also
reflect  the positive  association  between  firm  quality  and  access to  long  term  credit.
Finally,  larger  firms  are likely  to  have  better  bargaining  power and  greater political
influence in obtaining long term financial resources.21
One disturbing  additional  result  is  that,  conditional  on  size, operating  profits
either  do  not  increase the probability  of  receiving  long term  credit or may actually
decrease  it.  Moreover,  conditional  on  having  obtained  access,  they  are negatively
correlated with the length of the maturity structure of debt. This raises some questions on
the mechanism used in allocating long term financial resources in Ecuador.
It  is  interesting that  the  negative  effect  of  profits  is  greater before  financial
liberalization, suggesting that the allocation problem was particularly severe for directed
credit.  After  financial liberalization,  the  coefficient  on profit  increases, but  not  quite
enough  to  make  it  positive.  The  increase  is  consistent  with  the  presence of  greater
incentives for banks to pay more attention at accounting measures of firms' credit rating. .
This would also be confirmed by the fact that the (positive) coefficient of the log of total
real  assets  is  significantly  and  substantially  larger  after  financial  reform,  which  is
consistent with a greater importance of collateral.  The negativity of the coefficient also
in the post reform period could be explained by the fact that better (more profitable) firms
prefer to use short termn  credit. Alternatively,  it could be due to the fact that allocation
problems still remain for long term directed credit, which, in spite of its real contraction,
has increased as a share of total long term  credit in 91 and 92, due to the even faster real
decrease in the supply of market provided credit.
The data also suggest that  there  is  a  strong  positive association between asset
maturity  and debt  maturity. This  matching  of  assets  and liabilities confirms both  the
conventional wisdom and the theoretical models that can be used to rationalize it.Does  the  availability  of  long  term  finance  make  a  difference  to  a  firm's
perforrnance, either in terms of productivity or of capital accumulation?  With respect to
productivity, does long term credit facilitate the access to more productive technologies
or  does the less intense monitoring and the lesser fear of liquidation associated with long
term  debt  actually  reduce  productivity?  The  results  obtained  from  estimating  an
augmented  production  function  are  quite  unequivocal  in  suggesting  that  a  shorter
maturity is not conducive  to greater productivity.  Moreover there is some evidence that
long term debt may actually lead to productivity  improvements.  Although these results
suggest  that long  term  debt  may  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  quality  of  capital
accumulation, estimation of an investment  equation does not show a large and significant
impact of the maturity structure of debt on the amount of fixed investment.23
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DATA APPENDIX
The  empirical research is  based  on  information collected by  the  "Superintendencia de
Compaftias"(SC)  of Ecuador. The SC is a government agency that controls  corporate activities.
By law, all firms have to submit balance sheet and profit and losses information  to the SC in
order to do business  in Ecuador and in order to obtain credit (official  loans, as well as regular
credit), tax identification  numbers, and other legal requirements.
The balance sheets also include, together with  the standard items, information on
reevaluations  of assets allowed by the Government to account for inflation  and exchange rate
depreciation. The capital stock measure  is  the  revalued  one  and  it  includes plant  and
machinery, buildings  and others (excluding  land).
We use two samples  in the analysis. Both of them are based on data accounting  collected  by the
SC.  -
The first (unbalanced)  sample (SC1) includes 731 Ecuadorian  manufacturing  companies
during the period 1984  - 1988, out of which 366 firms have data for the full five year period. It
contains detailed  information  on firms' real and financial  variables. All the variables used in the
paper are the ones derived from the balance sheets or profit and loss account. The only
exception is the figure for the stock of inventories that has been computed  by multiplying  the
firm level sale figure by the industry wide inventory to sales ratio in each year.
The second sample (SC2), after  eliminating firms with missing, unacceptable, or
inconsistent data, or firms not engaged in production activities, consists of 850 firms with
complete information  available the period 1982-1992. Even though this sample is longer and
more recent, it contains  more aggregate  and therefore fewer variables.26
The following table summarizes the structure  of the sample.
Category  SC  1  SC2
sample  Percent  Cum.  Cum.  sample  Percent  Cum..  Cum.
Frequen  Freq.  Per.  Frequen  Freq.  Per.
cy  cy
By Size
Micro  28  3.83%  28  3.83%  212  24.94%  212  24.94%
Small  216  29.55%  244  33.38%  213  25.06%  425  50.00%
Medium  355  48.56%  599  81.94%  213  25.06%  638  75.06%
Large  132  18.06%  731 100.00  212  24.94%  850 100.00
By Age
Youngest  171  23.39%  171  23.39%  282  33.18%  282  33.18%
Young  260  35.57%  431  58.96%  456  53.65%  738  86.82%
Old  150  20.52%  581  79.48%  92  10.82%  830  97.65%
Oldest  150  20.52%  731 100.00  20  2.35%  850 100.00
By Sector
31: Food and  143  19.60%  143  19.60%  189  22.20%  189  22.20%
Beverages
32: Textiles  111  15.18%  254  34.78%  132  15.50%  320  37.70%
33: Lumber  45  6.10%  299  40.88%  41  4.80%  361  42.50%
34: Paperandprinting  73  9.99%  372  50.87%  78  9.20%  439  51.70%
35: Chemicals  139  19.02%  511  69.89%  170  20.00%  609  71.70%
36: Metallic minerals  43  5.88%  554  75.77%  49  5.80%  659  77.50%
37: Nonmetallic  19  2.60%  573  78.37%  23  2.70%  682  80.20%
minerals
38: Machinery  144  19.70%  717  98.07%  145  17.00%  826  97.20%
39: Others  14  1.92%  731  99.98%  24  2.80%  850 100.00
Notes for SCI: Definition of size by capital stock in the initial year: Micro USS 2000  <  K;
Small: US$ 2000  <  K <  US$ 40000; Medium:  US$ 40000<  K  <  US$ 600000; Large K  >
US$ 600000.  K:  machinery, plant and equipment,  other (excluding land); K is valued at  1975
US Dollars. Definition of age: youngest:  born after  1980; young: born between 1970 and 1980;
old born between 1960 and 1970; oldest: born before  1960.
Notes  for SC2: Definition of Size in initial  year:  Micro  if real value of total assets  <  Sucres
2478  ; Small if Sucres 2478  <  Real value  of total assets  <  Sucres 9022; Medium if Sucres
9022  <  real value of total assets<  Sucres 32868;  large  if real value of total assets  >  Sucres
32868. All values at  1982 prices.
Definition of age: youngest 15 years old, young  born between 15 and 30 years of age; old born
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EVOLUTION  OF AGGREGATE  DEBT
Year  Total debt  Short term (< 1 year)  Long term (> 1 year)  |Long  trmdebt
% of GDP  Growth rate (real)  % of GDP  Growth rate (real)  % of GDP  Growth rate (real)  Total debt
1980  14.6%  na  na  na
1981  15.5%  10.7%  na  na  na  na  na
1982  18.2%  18.7%  na  na  na  na  na
1983  23.1%  23.4%  na  na  na  na  na
1984  21.2%  -4.4%  18.5%  na  2.7%  na  12.6%
1985  19.4%  -4.7%  16.6%  -6.3%  2.8%  6.9%  14.4%
1986  18.3%  -2.9%  16.1%  -0.3%  2.2%  -18.9%  12.1%
1987  18.2%  -6.0%  15.8%  -7.0%  2.4%  1.8%  13.3%
1988  12.5%  -24.3%  10.5%  -26.2%  2.0%  -11.2%  16.0%
1989  10.0%  -20.0%  8.2%  -22.5%  1.7%  -5.4%  17.2%
1990  9.1%  -5.9%  7.6%  -5.3%  1.5%  -8.5%  16.8%
1991  10.7%  22.9%  9.7%  33.8%  1.0%  -31.1%  9.4%
1992  10.9%  5.8%  10.0%  7.5%  0.9%  -10.8%  7.9%
1993  14.4%  35.0%  na  na  na  na  na
1994  20.4%  47.1%  na  na  na  na  na
1995  25.0%  25.9%  na  na  na  na  na
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador. "Informaci6n Estadistica Mensual", several issues;
Superintendencia de Bancos, "Memorias",  several issues.Table 2
DIRECTED  CREDIT PROGRAMS
(aggregate figures)
ear  Directed  credit  Directed  credit
programs/Total  programs  (real
credit  growth  rates)
984  52.7%
985  35.2%  -37.1%
986  29.0%  -15.0%
987  21.4%  -26.3%
988  27.7%  22.6%
989  17.9%  -41.4%
990  16.1%  -15.4%
991  12.5%  -8.3%
992  9.2%  -26.8%
Source: Superintendencia de Bancos, "Memorias",  several issues.
Table 3
DIRECTED  CREDIT  PROGRAMS
(by type of program)
l____________  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
CFN  5,932  11,223  18,236  17,349  30,772  37,089  56,212  81,031
Agriculture.  na  764  1,218  2,424  2,940  5,735  3,960  10,423  9,529
Manufacture  na  5,036  9,102  14,907  13,541  24,610  32,720  43,028  66,590
Construction  na  20  24
Commerce  na  109  546  642  646  283  283  733  4,317
Transport.  na  23  195  85  35  35  1,727  109
Financial  na  43  43  52  3
Services  na  82  154  222 - 67  50  125  110
Others  na  61  124  374
BNF  22.971  37,376  42,854  47,549  59,280  87,279  132,546  226,238  366,345
Agriculture  16,061  25,882  32,595  31,456  39,172  59,106  96,732  159,702  261,848
Small industry.  2,641  3,704  3,376  5,880  6,250  9,440  12,731  19,506  28,448
Fishery  599  523  611  1,286  1,303  3,196  2,831  7,241  10,261
Transportation  1,670  4,048  1,216  1,321  1,876  2,275  2,358  4,232  8,388
Tourism  98  323  249  312  242  418  476  1,110  1,176
Commerce  1,902  2,897  4,808  7,294  10,440  12,845  17,418  34,447  56,224
Central Bank  194,304  135,583  129,629  121,032  194,221  230,723  284,326  311,840  215,723
Total  217,276  178,890  183,706  186,817  270,850  348,774  453,961  594,290  663,098
% of CFN  n.a  3.3%  6.1%  9.8%  6.4%  8.8%  8.2%  9.5%  12.2%
% of BNF  10.6%  20.9%  23.3%  25.5%  21.9%  25.0%  29.2%  38.1%  55.2%
% of BCE  89.4%  75.8%  70.6%  64.8%  71.7%  66.2%  62.6%  52.5%  32.5%
(BNF+CFN)  59.3%  70.8%  56.7%  38.0%  35.0%  35.9%  63.4%  78.7%
long term credit
BCE  31.1%  23.3%  16.0%  18.4%  14.3%  12.1%  7.3%  3.3%
short temm  credit  I
Source: Superintendencia de Bancos, "Memorias", several issues.Table  4
INTEREST  RATES ON DIRECTED  CREDIT  PROGRAMS
AND MARKET  RATES
(1) FOPEX and other  (2) Lending market  Size of the subsidy
CFN credit programs  rates  (2)/(1)
1983  12  19  1.58
1984  18  23  1.28
1985  18  25.6  1.42
1986  18  30.7  1.71
1987  23  38.79  1.69
1988  23  44.57  1.94
1989  32  49.16  1.54
1990  39  53.09  1.36
1991  47  55.82  1.19
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, "Infornacion  Estadistica Mensual", several issues.
Table  5
LONG TERM  DEBT/TOTAL  DEBT
Aggregate  data  SCI Sample (*)  SC2 Sample (**)
1984  12.6%  11.5%  27%
1985  14.4%  13.8%  27%
1986  12.1%  17.7%  28%
1987  13.3%  19.1%  28%
1988  16.0%  17.0%  27%
1989  17.2%  na  25%
1990  16.8%  na  25%
1991  9.4%  na  25%
1992  no/X  1992  ~~~~~~~~7.9%/  na  20%
(*)  Long term credit  . (**) Long term liabilities
Long term + short term  + trade debt  Total liabilities
Table  6
ACCESS TO LONG  TERM  DEBT
PART  l:  over  the  entire  period
SCI  sample  SC2  sample
No. of firms  %  0  No. of firms  T_  %
Never  214  29.3%  25  2.9%
Some  311  42.5%  538  63.3%
Always  206  28.2%  287  33.8%
Total  731  100%  850  100%
PART  II:  firms with positive long term debt,  by year
SCI  sample  _  SC2  sample
No.  of  %  of total  No. of  %  of total
observations  observations  observations  observations
1984  171  37.1%  623  73.3%
1985  226  42.5%  617  72.6%
1986  307  56.0%  649  76.4%
1987  381  59.2%  658  77.4%
1988  362  58.9%  657  77.3%
1989  na  na  649  76.4%
1990  na  na  668  78.6%
1991  na  na  654  76.9%
1992  na  na  584  68.7%
Total  1447  51.7%  6996  74.8%
Source:  see data appendixTable  7
ACCESS  TO LONG  TERM  DEBT
PART l: by size  |
SCI sample  SC2 sample
No. of firms  %  No. of firms  %
Smallest  28  100%  212  100%
Never  14  50%  16  7.5%
Some  11  39.3%  161  75.9%
Always  3  10.7%  35  16.5%
Small  216  100%  213  100%
Never  94  43.5%  5  2.3%
Some  86  39.8%  157  73.7%
Always  36  16.7%  51  23.9%
Large  355  100%  213  100%
Never  94  26.5%  4  1.9%
Some  165  46.5%  133  62.4%
Always  96  27%  71  35.7%
Largest  132  100%  212  100%
Never  12  9.1%  0  0%
Some  49  37.1%  87  41%
Always  71  53.8%  125  59%
PART II:  by age  _ 
SCI sample  T  SC2  sample
No. of firms  %  No. of firms
Youngest  171  100%  282  100%
Never  61  35.7%  9  3.2%
Some  66  38.6%  194  68.8%
Always  44  25.7%  79  28.0%
Young  260  100%  456  100%
Never  82  31.5%  14  3.1%
Some  112  43.1%  285  62.5%
Always  66  25.4%  157  34.4%
Old  150  100%  92  100%
Never  34  22.7%  2  2.2%
Some  69  46.0%  47  51.1%
Always  47  31.3%  43  46.7%
Oldest  150  100%  20  100%
Never  37  24.7%  0  0%
Some  64  42.7%  12  60%
Always  49  32.6%  8  40%
PART Ill: by bank  association
SCI  sample  SC2 sample
No. of firms  %  No. of firms  %
Not  606  100%  na  na
associated
Never  184  30.4%  na  na
Some  268  44.2%  na  na
Always  154  25.4%  na  na
Associated  109  100%  na  na
Never  19  17.4%  na  na
Some  40  36.7%  na  na
Always  50  45.9%  na  na
Unknown  16  100%  na  na
Never  11  68.8%  na  na
Some  3  18.8%  na  na
Always  2  12.4%  na  na
Source:  see data appendixTable  8
LONG TEIRM DEBT AND OTIIER  FIRM'S  CHARACTERISTICS
PART  l: SCI sample
Mean  value  of characteristics  Mean  values  of characteristics
Never  Some  Always  Below  Between  Above  3d.
median  median  and  quartile
3d.  quartile
Maturity  (Long  term debt/total  debt)  0.000  0.165  0.324  0.023  0.179  0.430
Leverage  (Total  debttotal capital)  0.505  0.603  0.644  0.563  0.616  0.605
Liquid  assets/total  capital  0.069  0.083  0.067  0.080  0.077  0.062
Clients/total  capital  0.236  0.227  0.213  0.254  0.221  0.173
Fixed  assets/total  capital  0.534  0.540  0.598  0.504  0.559  0.650
Sales  (real  growth  rate)  0.044  0.066  0.067  0.053  0.059  0.078
Operating  surplus/capital  stock  0.120  0.151  0.152  0.150  0.152  0.120
Investment/Capital  stock  0.241  0.226  0.214  0.238  0.212  0.223
Capital  stock  (millions  of 1975  sucres)  1.386  3.027  7.184  2.224  4.479  3.824
Sales  (millions  of 1975  sucres)  5.486  10.706  18.145  9.571  14.190  8.074
PART  II: sc2 sample
Mean  value  of characteristics  Mean  value  of characteristics
Never  Some  Always  Below  Between  Above
median  median  3d.
and 3d.  quartile
._______  quartile
Long  term  liabilities/total  liabilities  00  0.22  0.35  0.04  0.29  0.65
Total  liabilities/total  assets  0.31  0.54  0.59  0.35  0.64  0.84
Liquid  assets/total  assets  0.47  0.44  0.43  0.14  0.61  0.85
Profits/total  assets  2.212  22.135  62.255  -0.2  0.5  0.14
Total  assets  (millions  of 1975  sucres)  2.212  22.135  62.255  2.457  15.054  120.437
Source:  see data appendixTable 9
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS  OF ACCES
TO LONG  TERM DEBT (SC1 sample)
PROBIT  PROBIT  LOGIT  LOGIT
maximum  maximum  maximum  maximum
likelihood  likelihood  likelihood  likelihood
random effects  fixed  effects
AGE2  0.03  0.00  0.05
(0.38)  (0.00)  (0.37)
AGE3  -0.04  -0.13  -0.07
-(0.49)  -(0.58)  -(0.44)
AGE4  -0.13  -0.34  -0.21
-(1.32)  -(1.49)  -(1.31)
BAND  -0.05  -0.01  -0.10
-(0.60)  -(0.04)  -(0.67)
LASKI  0.51  1.32  0.78  2.72
(1.59)  (2.41)  (1.46)  (2.39)
LEVI  0.44  0.53  0.72  0.13
________________  (6.28)  (4.73)  (6.16)  (0.39)
CFK1  -0.20  -0.46  -0.33  -0.58
-(0.94)  -(1.19)  -(0.93)  -(0.60)
LRKAPI  0.29  0.50  0.48  0.58
(12.99)  (9.32)  (12.56)  (1.86)
RHO  0.68
(10.47)
2 314.417  353.626  314.045
(p-value)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
Nobs  2069  2069  2069  1869
Nfirms  731  731  731  531
Footnote:  year and industry  dummies  includedTable  10
LENGTH  OF MATURITY  EQUATION  (SC1 sample)
TWO  STAGE  TWO STAGE
HECKIT(PROBIT  HECKIT(LOGIT
SELECTION)  SELECTION)
AGE2  -0.01  -0.02
(-0.33)  (-0.94)
AGE3  -0.04  -0.04
(-1.00)  (-1.65)
AGE4  -0.05  -0.04
(-1.11)  (-1.56)
BAND  -0.01  0.01
(-0.18)  (0.46)
SS1  0.29  0.30
(5.91)  (8.03)
LEVI  0.12  0.05
(2.07)  (1.93)
CFKI  -0.20  -0.19
. ___________________  (-2.14)  (-3.27)
GYREALI  0.29  0.03
(1.26)  (1.67)
LRKAP1  0.04  0.01
(1.26)  (0.43)
LASK1  0.28  0.27
(1.99)  (3.08)
LAMBDA  0.50  0.18
(2.41)  (3.05)
F-stat  10.14  10.02
(p-value)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Nobs (positive)  1.140  1140
Nfirms  731  731
Footnote:  year and industry  dummies  includedTable  11
SAMPLE  SELECTION  MODEL FOR  ACCESS  TO THE LONG TERM
DEBT AND MATURITY  EQUATION  (SC2 sample)
PROBIT  TWO STAGE  HECKIT
AGE2  -0.13  -0.02
_____________  __  _  _  (-3.57)  (-1.73)
AGE3  -0.01  0.04
(-0.16)  (2.54)
AGE4  -0.22  0.02
(-1.83)  (0.95)
PROFI  -2.23  -0.82
(-6.74)  (-8.30)
PROFI*LD  1.22  0.67
__________________  (3.03)  (6.10)
LRTAI  0.064  -0.00
(7.89)  (-1.74)
LRTAI*LD  0.24  0.00
(16.17)  (0.22)
LEVI  0.73  0.26
(9.52)  (11.97)
ASSI  0.28
X _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _  (14.19)
!LAMBDA  0.40
(9.08)
j  t2  1115.48




Nobs (positive)  6113
Nfirms  731  731
Footnote:  year and industry  dummies  includedTable  12
PRODUCTION  FUNCTION  (SCI  sample)
Dependent  variable:  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM
LRY  first  first  first  first
differences differences  differences  differences
l ____________________________  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04
I____________________  -(3.65)  -(4.08)  -(4.57)  -(2.60)
LRYI  0.41
(3.23)
LRM  0.46  0.38  0.39  0.36
(8.61)  (6.64)  (6.96)  (5.51)
LRM1  -0.15
-(1.98)
LRK  0.08  0.05  0.05  0.15





LRN  0.42  0.45  0.46  0.42
(6.64)  (6.24)  (6.87)  (3.33)
MAT  -0.03  0.16  0.18  0.35
-(1.16)  (1.70)  (2.28)  (2.04)
MAT1  -0.096
___________  ____________  -(1.58)  ,
LEV  0.01  0.02
(0.22)  (0.198)
LEV1  -0.005  -0.001
-(0.24)  -(0.03)
D87  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.016
-(3.77)  -(3.01)  -(3.18)  -(0.93)
D88  -0.05  -0.04  -0.04  -0.024
-(5.52)  -(3.25)  -(3.44)  -(1.23)
Wald  ldf]  206.30(51  169.66[5]  183.52[4]  172.50111]
(p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Sargan  [df]  64.82[31]  56.89[31]  59.20[32]  19.90[25]
(p-value)  0.000  0.003  0.002  0.752
Ml  -3.543  -2.714  -3.488  -4.642
(p-value)  0.000  0.007  0.000  0.000
M2  -1.277  -0.766  -0.761  0.089
(p-value)  0.202  0.444  0.447  0.929Table  13
INVESTMENT  FUNCTION  (SC1 sample)
Dependent  variable:  GMM  GMM
IK  first differences  first differences
(1)  (3)
Constant  0.02  0.02
(2.18)  (1.34)
IKl  S  0.11  0.09
(2.25)  (1.75)
IKI L  0.07  0.08
(1.67)  (1.52)
CFKNIS  0.24  0.24
(2.37)  (2.33)
CFKNIL  0.14  0.17
__________________  ~~(1.69)  (1.85)
GYRIS  0.04  0.03
(1.88)  (1.59)














LEVIS  -0.0007  -0.02
-(0.01)  -(0.34)
LEVIL  -0.002  0.03
-(0.05)  (0.72)
D87  -0.01  -0.003
____________________  -(0.58)  -(0.156)
D88  -0.05  -0.035
-(3.2)  -(2.22)
ald [dt]  29.40110]  33.48[12]
(p-value)  0.001  0.001
|Sargan  [df]  64.49[50]  54.70[48]
(p-value)  0.082  0.227
Ml  -9.325  -8.725
(p-value)  0.000  0.000
M2  0.712  0.596
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